A model for estimating the effect of public policies on the demand for higher education is presented, with attention focused on the influences of public policy and the economic environment, and the interaction of these factors with student ability and parental income. Policy instruments are tuition, admissions requirements, location of different kinds of colleges, and draft deferments. The following economic and social environmental factors are indirectly influenced by government: the social status of the student's neighborhood, the opportunity cost of the student's study time, and the size of the anticipated earnings payoff to college graduation. A binominal logit model was fitted to the college attendance behavior of 27,046 male high school juniors, divided into 20 subgroups defined by student ability and family income, in 1960. Tuition, high admission standards travel costs, and room and board costs had significant negative effects on attendance. The highest elasticities of demand were found for the low-income strata and lower-middle ability quartile, suggesting that an efficient subsidy program should focus on these groups. The powerful impacts of public policy measures and draft pressure suggest that the Vietnam War and public policy shifts that lowered the real cost of college attendance contributed to the high growth rate of college attendance in the 1950s and 1960s. The policies that contributed to this growth were increased student aid, liberalized admission requirements, and the establishment of new community colleges and public universities in previously unserved areas. (SW) *********************************************************************** * Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made * * from the original document. * *********************************************************************** Points of view or opinions stated in this docu. ment do not necessarily represent official ME position or policy.
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THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC POLICIES ON THE DEMAND FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
Despite the fact that Ige equal access to higher education has been an objective public policy for over a decade, little is known about the effectiveness of alternative means of achieving this goal. Econometric work has established that college attendance is positively associated with parental education, family income, and student ability, and negatively related to tuition [Campbell.and Siegel, 1967; Hopkins, 1974] .
It Ras been suggested that youth from low-income backgrounds have' higher elasticities of demand, and a number of studies have obtained results that are consistent with this hypothesis [Corazzini et al., 1972; Hoenack, 1971; Radner and Miller, 1970; Kohn et ale, 1974] . Little is kLown, however, about the impact of admissions policy, college location or curriculum, draft pressure, or the economic enviiOnment on college entrance decisions.
Nothing is known about the relative effectiveness of alternative policy measures on different ability groups. This paper will attempt to fill these.gaps in the literature by estimating a model of college entrance that focuses on the influences of public policy and.the economic environment, and the interaction of these factors with student ability and parental income. The policy instrUmeni; examined are tuition, admissions requirements, location of different kinds of colleges, and draft deferments. The aspects of the economic and social environment indirectly influenced by government that are examined are the social status of the student's neighborhood, tile opportunity cost of the student's study time, and the size of the anticipated earnings payoff to college graduation.
A binomial logit model is fitted by maximum likelihood to the behavior of 27,046 male high-school juniors in 1960, categorized by ability quartiles and by five family-income strata.
Por estimating response to price, the Project Talent data used here are better than any previously available. The study is longitudinal;
we do not depend upon memory for measures of student ability or of high school location or character, and the dependent variable is actual attendance rather than plans to attend. The large sample size allows the estimatic of separate models for different income/ability groups. It is national and thus has variation in that most critical variable, tuition. 'Even its age is an advantage. Only limited amounts of scholarship aid were available at public institutions in 1961 wben our sample was graduating from high school, so the difficulty of satisfactorily modeling the scholarship awarding process does not create serious problems. There are problems with the response rate for the Projeit Talent Sample, however; these problems and how they are handled are discussed in the Appendix.
Tuition, high admission standards, foregone earnings and travel, and room and board costs are found to have a significant negative effect on attendance. The per dollar effect of tuition is larger than any other cost and is largest of all for low-Income, middlerability students.
Crossrsectional measures of the expected payoff to college have a negligible relationship with attendance. The powerful impacts of palic policy measures and draft pressure suggest that the rise in college attendance rates in the fifties and sixties was partly due to the liberalization of admissions policies, the establishment of new community colleges and public four-year colleges in cities and states that had had none before, and the Vietnam War.
Section 1 presents the theoretical underpinnings of the estimating equations and describes the variables used to predict college attendance.
Section 2 presentS the results anedevelops some of their policy impliaations. .Section 3 uses the7cross-sectiohal iesults to interpret recent trends in college enrollment and to question projections of substantial declines in enrollment rates.
THE COLLEGE ATTENDANCE DECISION
An' individual will enter college if the expected utility from any of the feasible college alternatives is greater than the utility of the best noncollege alternative. If unlimited borrowing were possible at a given interest rate and there were no debt aversion, lifetime utility maximization would imply college attendance when, discounted at this interest rate, the present value of benefits (both pecuniary and nonpecuniary) exceeds the pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs of attendance.
Since the students in our sample could not borrow thousands of dollars at fixed interest rates, implementing a deiire to attend calege required, as well, an ability to finance the out-of-pocket costs.
1
The sum of resources availablesavings, summer and part-time earnings, gifts, and loans--must be greater than the total out-of-pocket costs. of attending collegetuition, travel, and all liiring.costs.
Al youth attends college if, relative to the best noncollege alternative, there is at least one college that is simultaneously desired and possible to finance. Only one college meeting these requirements is necessary. It is not, therefore, the average tuition, selectivity, and proximity of thevolleges in a particular jurisdiction that should enter our model, but.rather the characteristics of the "most attractive" college. Hyp: 812 < 0.
X13 a. an index of the frequency and recentcy of school changes.
Frequent dhanges may reflect an unstable home environment.
A change of schools cannot help but disrupt the educational process and the more recent the change the greater 'will be the effect on college attendance. The coefficient on this variable is, therefore, expected to be negative.
This model was fitted separately to date for twenty groups of high school juniors, each group defined.by ability and familY income. Table   1 presents the weighted mean probability of entering college (P) for each of these 20 groups.
A logit specification of a statistical model of the college atten dance decision has been derived from choice theory by a number of authors [Bishop, 1976b; Kohn et al., 1974] . For the analysis of dichot omous choice, a logit specification has a number of advantages. a) Its coefficients are directly interpretable as measuring proportionate changes in the odds of an event. b) Its coefficients are easily translated into predicted changes in probability or elasticities. c) It has a computable likelihood function and is, therefore, easy to estimate in individual data.
d) Most important of all the response curve to increases in a stimulus has the sigmoidal shape that dichotomous choice problems almost always In the past the most common method of analyzing dichotomous choice has been estimating linear probability functions using ordinary least squares. This approach, however, does not constrain a probability to the zero-one interval and suffers from heteroskedasticity when fitted to individual data. The probit specification is rejected becguse white it avoid the problebs of the linear probability model, it_is harder to compute than a logit and very difficult to interpret.
2.
RESULTS
This rather parsimonious logit model proved quite succesiful in explaining college entrance behavior. For within-Strata models R2 ranged between .38 and .067 and entropy reductions ranged between .211 and 034. (A complete set of the estimated maximum likelihood parameters is available from the author on request.) Table 2 presents the detailed results for the two most important policy instruments for controlling enrollment in higher education: tTuition significantly more negative than travel, room, and board at the .05 level.
Marginal Subsidy Cost MC -MR (MC-T) + (T-MR)
9.00 + 13/(6/dX1).
-* a) tuition and b) travel plus incremental room and board costn. For each income-ability strata we present estimated logit coefficients for and predictions of the change in the groups aggregate college entrance rate per $100 change in tuition. If one accepts the theory behind the logit specification, it is the logit coefficient that should be stable across studies, and with appropriate deflation for price or wage 'changes, should be stable over time. If the predicted probability of attendance ) is known for the "j"th individual, the elasticity of his probability A. of enrollment is given by n = e 3E (14 ). For instance, a high-ability, j lower-middle-income, student whose predicted probability of entrance is .3 has elasticity of .286(i.e., .204^2.(.7)] if he faces a tuition of $200.
As one moves down a logit demand curve there is a precipitous decline in the elasticity of demand. Cutting tuition in half will more than halve the elasticity of demand. An outward shift of a logit demand curve also lowers elasticities. This leads us to expect students with high income or high ability to have significantly lower elasticities of demand.7
The "i"th individual's change in probability of attendance per unit change in X j is given by dP /dX
Note that the probability multiplier ranges between 0 and .25 and is largest when the individual has a .5 probability of attending college. The student for whom the elasticity of demand was calculated earlier is predicted to experience a .043 = [i.e., .3(.7).204] decrease.in.his.probability of attendance if tuition rises by $100.
The purpose of estimating our model of college entrance is to make predictions about response of groups to policy. Tbe change inia group's attendance rate per unit change in X is obtained by calculating the change in probability for each member of the group and summing across the NA A whole group dV/dX E P (1-P )8 /N. The change in a group's attendance 1.51 I rate is necessarily smaller (10 to 25 percent'lower in our data set) than the change in the probability of attendance predicted for a person with mean Characteristics (i.e., P 8 Consequently, predicting the effect of a policy change on group behavior by evaluating logit coefficients at sample means will systematically overstate the expected impact.
Higher Education Policies
Tuition at the minimum-cost college had a major effect on college The impact of tuition on college attendance also varied with family income. Btudents from the high-income stratum were least responsive, and students from the low-income stratum were the-most responsive. At the mean tuition of 8200, the tuition elasticity of fhe high-income stratum is -.084; for the poverty stratum it is -.393. Tuition elasticity was powerfully and nonlinearly related to ability: The high-ability quartile's tuition elasticity was -.05, the lower-middle-ability quartile's elasticity was -.07.
These systematic variations in the elasticity of demand by ability and family income have some important policy implications. The marginal subsidy cost of an extra student is equal to the per-student subsidy of instructional cost plus the difference between the price paid and the marginal revenue. 9 The tabulation of marginal subsidy costs in Table 2 reveals that they are inversely correlated with tuition elasticity. If in 19C1 a million dollars had been spent lowering the general level of tuition for new high school graduates and providing the staff to teach them, 436 new full-time students would have been produced. In the 1960s almost all scholarship aid went to students in the top-ability quartile.
A million dollars spent in this way, however, resulted in only 209 extra students. Limiting eligibility to the bottom three income groups hardly changes the number of new students (fIlm 209 to 215). The policy of aiding the able has been criticized on equity grounds [Denison 1974 ]. Our results indicate that if the objective of policy is simply "more students," aiding the able is also inefficient. By this criterion aiding students from law-income families is even more efficient than general reductions in tuition. A million dollars made available to poverty students of all abilities would have produced 710 extra students in 1961.
Federal intervention into higher education financing seems to reflect this view of the relative effectiveness of alternative strategies for promoting attendance, for priority has been given to students as opposed to institutional aid and eligibility for Basic Opportunity Grants has been made a function of family income only.
Despite the difficulty of accurately measuring the costs of travel, room, and board, nine statistically significant negative coefficients are obtained (see the bottom panel of Table 2 ). Averaged oller all subgroups, a $100 increase in these other costs lowered the attendance rate by .0089. The per-dollar effect of travel, room, and board averaged about 30 percent of tuition's impact._ This was expected, because tuition was measured more accurately than other costs and may have a uniquely powerful psychological impact. The hypothesis that the per-dollar effect of travel, room, and board was less negative than tuition' per-dollar effect was accepted for twelve subgroups.
In Table 3 the results for the different variables are used to produce estimates of the effect of specific public policy decisions on entrance rates disaggregated by either ability quartile or income strata.
Locating the minimum-cost college in the center of a city rather than in the outskirts lowers the average, travel distance for everyone in a metropolitan area by about four miles. This reduces cost by $67 and the average attendance rate is predicted to increase by .006 (i.e., .65 x .0089). Establishing a new public four-year college in a city without one A newly established local college was assumed to be on average four and one-half milwfrom its clientele and to be an alternative to a college with room and board charges of $600.-The net savings was $471 so the tabulated effect on attendance equals 4.71 times Average distance to college (using doubling for first three miles) went from 9.67 to 5.67, so R was reduced by $671. This assumed a constant density in the center (radius three miles) that was three times the ring's density and a uniform distribution of income and ability groups within the city. Assumes the two-year college was the cheapeat college both before and after the tuition change at the four-year college. Higher tuition in the last two years of a four-year college would also cause the tabulated enrollment effects. In 1960 the typical city in Indiana had an extension campus with a 50 percent admissions cutoff and tuition of $199. This is compared to a California town with a free open-door community college but no four-year institution. Line 9 = 3 + 7 -4. Except for students from poverty backgrounds, admissions requirements also had substantial effects on attendance (line 6). If a state were to go from accepting half to accepting all of its high school graduates, the proportion entering college would rise by .038., 'As one might expect, the less able are quite sensitive to admissions policy; the pronortion entering from the bottom-ability quartile would rise by .067. The breadth of curriculum at the cheapest college also had an important impact on college entrance (see line 3). When the cheapest college was a two-year extension campus without vocational programs, the proportion entering college was reduced by .046.
There is a substantial degree of variation across the country in the extent to which state policies promote college attendance. Lines 9 and 10 of This is a large effect; per $1000 of real income it is nearly as large as the effect of the income of one's own family. Comparing the college nonattendance rates in the columns of Table 1 , we obtain, per $1000 of real income a .027 change in probability as the approximate total effect of family income holding ability constant (line 12, Table 3 ). Competing with many additional variables, the point estimate for neighborhood effects is .016 per $1000.
Higher opportunity costs of student time have a generally negative effect on college entrance. The sign of its coefficient (e7) is negative in fifteen of the subgroups and significantly so in seven. Per dollar, however, the opportunity cost of student time has a much smaller effect on college attendance than does tuition and a somewhat smaller effect than costs of travel, room, and board. Averaged over the full sample tuition's impact is five times that of foregone earnings. This difference is significant at .01 level. The mean coefficient for travel, room, and board is 60'percent'larger--a difference that is significant at the .05 level.
These smaller coefficients on foregone earnings were not a surprise.
Theory had led us to expect them because higher local wage rates signal not only a higher real price of college attendance but also greater resources available for self-financing college attendance. Our sample of 1960 high school juniors did not have access to large loans at fixed interest rates. When loans are unavailable or insufficient, the student's ability to earn money by part-time and summer work will partially determine whether he attends college [Parsons, 1974) . The smaller coefficients on foregone earnings can, therefore, be interpreted as evidence that in 1961 many students found the ability to finance college an important con- high income may reflect their greater tendency io migrate or to judge returns on the basis of national, as opposed to local, evidence.
Between 1968 and 1974 the income differential between college and high school graduates has fallen by a third. In our data a reduction of one-third in the local earnings differential ($1000 in 1960 prices) produced an overall drop in the college entrance rate of only .021.
These very small impacts suggest, that either future returns are not known with any accuracy or are discounted at extremely high_(> 50.percent) interest rates or that local variations in the return do not affect the formation of expectations about the payoff to college. If one accepts either of the first two explanations, the current decline in the return to college cannot be expected to cause a large reduction in enrollment.
In the early sixties the selective service system contended that "many young men would not have pursued higher education had there not been a Selective Service program of student deferment" [Hershey, 1961, p. 25] . The effectiveness of "channeling," as this policy objective was called, is supported by our results. Significant positive coefficients were obtained in nine of twenty strata. A rise of one standard deviation in draft pressure is predicted to increase attendance rates of high-income students by .032 and of all students by .015. Unlike the market-driven models of Freeman and Dresch, this scenario also provides an explanation of the contrasting behavior of men over age 25.
While the proportion ot males aged 18-24 (civilian and military) attending college has remained static since 1965, enrollment rates of men aged 25
and over has risen dramatically. The continuing increases in adult male enrollment rates are interpreted here as responses to the GI Bill and to the spread of community colleges [see Bishop and Van Dyk, 1975] .
If the market-driven models of Freeman and Dresch are correct, the college graduate labor market will be brought into equilibrium largely by the supply response of students. If the more complete model proposed here is correct, most of the postwar rise in enrollment rates is due to trend improvements in the income and education of the population and reduction in real cost of college attendance.
This implies that a large supply response to the current depressed the total population of juniors [Flanagan et al., 19641 . The proportion of these juniors who responded to one of the questionnaires mailed in 1962
and 1966 was only 53 percent, however. More intensive follow-up procedures were used for a 5 percent sample of the mail questionnaire nonrespondents, and data was obtained for 90 percent of this sample of nonrespondents.
A comparison of the two samples reveals that responding to a mailed . questionnaire is positively related to college attendance. Controlling for family background, the college attendance rate of the nonrespcndent sample was two-thirds that of the respondents. Probability of responding to the mailed questionnaires is not solely a function of college attendance, however.
Consequently, an unweighted logit model will yield biased estimates of many of the crucial parameters. Ilanski and Lerman [1976] Within the set of colleges defined by the above five conditions, the college that was assumed to be the "most attractive" was thn one that was least costly to attend. Cost was defined to include travel and incremental room and board costs. A computer program was written that for27,000 students in 1500 high schools selected from the pool of over 2000 possible colleges, the cheapest college meeting the five require-( ments described above. Use of the minimum-cost criterion is justified by the_fact that the college that is least costly to attend is the one least likely to be impossible to finance. When financing.the out-of-pocket costs is not a constraint, the cheapest college will still rank high by other criteria. For the 86 percent of the sample whose minimum cost college was within commuting distance, the mean distance to the college was 10.8 miles. The physical closeness of the college no doubt increased its salience. Trent and Medsker found that in towns with a junior college, almost three-quarters of those who went to college attended the local junior college (i.e., the minimum-cost college). Low cost and phypical proximity need be dominant considerations for only some of the students, however, for many others will focus on the same college simply because that is' where most of theik friends are attending. Lower expected pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits may in specific instances outweigh advantages of low cost, but for students near the margin on the decision to attend or not to attend this will happen only infrequently. if one of these students is 'admissible at the lov-cost public colleges of a state, a lowering of those colleges' en.enditures per student or a rise in tuition at higher-cost private colleges is not likely to dissuade the student altogether from attending college. Hopkins (lq741 found that 27 when tuition and proximity we ; held constant, a states' college attendance rates were not related to per-student expenditures in the public and private colleges of that state.
This constrained selection of the cheapest form of college attendanc:
usually results in a local public college representing the college availability environment. Using the approach described above, the primary ( determinants of the costs of college attendance turn out to be the level of instate tuition, the distance from the student's.high school to the nearest public institution, and whether a student lives'in a political jurisdiction with access to a low-tuition junior college. Since studies,of commuting typically find that travel time is valued at substantially below the average wage (Lave, 1970) . We assume that the mean opportunity cost was $.75 an hour. Distance from the stddents high school to a college was measured "as the crow flies" (except for a few explicit adjustments for tolls and necessarily roundabout routes). And an average 30 miles an hour was assumed. The first 3 or 5 miles of travel within cities of more than 100,000 population were assumed to cost twice as much per mile. For more detail see Bishop [1974] .
3 An early IQ measure would have been best but was not available. The test used was the Project Talent academic aptitude composite minus one of its subtests (a math information subtest focusing on the definitions of terms like quadratic and factorial that would only have bean covered in college preparatory math courses). 4 The alternative would he to estimate a full recursive model.
Curriculum, achievement test scores, and grades would he predicted with variables describing the levels of tuition and minimum cost And the relationship between minimum cost and a student's credentials at the end of his high school career. Attendance would then be predicted with the student's credentials and the characteristics of the cheapest college his credentials make him eligible for. Finally, the total effect of public policy would be obtained by summing the direct effects and the indirect effects through credentials.
5 The policy-making process that determines college location, tuition, and admissions policy is assumed to be independent of the error term of our equation. This assumption has also been made by all previous researchers. It can be justified either by-strict exfigeneity (infinitely elastic supply curves) or counteracting influences that balance out on average. 6 Entropy is a measure of the uncertainty of a probability distribution that is defined as minus the expectation of the logarithm of the probability. If the outcome being predicted has only two alternatives, the entropy ranges between 0 and -1n(.5) = .693. According to Then [1967] , it is a better measure than R 2 of goodness of fit for categorical dependent variables. 7 Because it is so sensitive to the mean of the varlable and attendance rate, there is no reason to expect the elasticity of demand to be the same in different studies or in different samples. 
